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Abstract. The Spanish Treasury is the only Treasury in the world that uses
a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government
debt: winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the
weighted average price of winning bids, and pay the weighted average price of
winning bids otherwise. Following Gordy (1996), we model the Spanish auction
as a common value auction of multiple units with private information, allowing
for multiple bids. Simulations show that bidders use bid spread to hedge against
both uncertainty and the winner's curse, and that the expected seller's revenue
is higher in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction in a number of cases.
Resumen. El Tesoro espa~nol es el ¶unico Tesoro del mundo que utiliza
un sistema h¶ibrido de subasta discriminatoria y uniforme para vender deuda
del estado: los pujadores ganadores pagan su puja por cada unidad, si esta
fue menor que la media de las pujas ganadoras, y pagan la media de las pu-
jas ganadoras en caso contrario. Siguiendo a Gordy (1996), desarrollamos un
modelo para la subasta espa~nola, como una subasta de valor com¶un y m¶ultiples
unidades, con informaci¶on privada, permitiendo que los pujadores pujen por
varias unidades. Utilizando simulaciones, encontramos que un pujador puja por
distintas unidades a precios distintos, para protegerse tanto de la incertidumbre
sobre el valor del bien como de la maldici¶on del ganador, y que el ingreso esper-
ado del vendedor es mayor con la subasta espa~nola que con la discriminatoria
en varios casos.
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Complutense for helpful suggestions. Any error is our responsibility. The authors express their
thanks for ¯nancial support toMinisterio de Ciencia y Teconolog¶ia from Proyecto SEC2000-
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1 Introduction
One of the most important auction markets in the world is the market for gov-
ernment debt. Treasuries apply mainly two auction formats: discriminatory and
uniform price auctions. In a discriminatory auction, winning bidders pay their
bid price for each unit. In a uniform price auction, all winning bidders pay the
same price for each unit, the minimum accepted price. The Spanish Treasury
is the only one that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price
auctions: winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than
the weighted average price of winning bids, whereas they pay the weighted aver-
age price of winning bids otherwise. With the Spanish format, the price that a
bidder pays for certain units depends on the bids of all winning bidders, includ-
ing his own bids. This fact increases the players' strategic considerations with
respect to discriminatory and uniform auctions, even in the simplest models.
Most of the discussion on Treasury auction design focuses on the choice
between discriminatory and uniform auctions, addressing the issue of which
auction format yields the seller higher revenue. Neither theoretical nor empiri-
cal papers are conclusive. Treasuries used to favor the discriminatory auction:
according to Bartolini and Cotarelli (1997), in 1994, 39 out of the 42 countries
that used auctions to sell Treasury securities used discriminatory auctions and
only 2 uniform auctions, Spain being the only country that used a di®erent
format. However, some Treasuries have lately changed to the uniform format:
for example, the U.S. Treasury, which exclusively used the discriminatory for-
mat, experimented with the uniform auction between 1992 and 1998, and then
switched entirely to the uniform auction in November 1998. Treasuries in Mex-
ico and Italy, among others, have also changed from the discriminatory to the
uniform format.
This paper considers the third auction format that is used to sell government
debt, the Spanish auction. We analyze a discrete auction example with common
values and with private information, for both the Spanish and the discrimina-
tory formats. We adapt Gordy's (1996) model for the discriminatory auction to
the Spanish auction. It is a discrete model that allows explicitly for the use of
multiple bids in a multiple-unit auction. Using numerical simulations, we ¯nd
all (if any) Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibria for the Spanish and the dis-
criminatory auctions, for a wide range of parameter combinations, and compare
equilibrium bids and seller's revenue for both auction formats.
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Many authors that study multiple-unit auctions where bidders demand more
than one unit, follow the "share auctions" approach, proposed by Wilson (1979),
where the good is assumed to be perfectly divisible and a bid is a smooth demand
schedule. In this paper we depart from this continuous approximation: the
model that we use is discrete. There are two units for sale, and bidders submit
one price bid for each of the two units; prices are restricted to a ¯nite set.
We use a discrete model mainly for two reasons. Firstly, because in the case
of Treasury auctions a discrete model provides a better description of reality
than a continuous model, given that there are minimal increments of prices and
quantities in actual auctions. And secondly, because as Gordy (1996) points
out, the advantage of a discrete framework is that "it makes a di±cult problem
solvable".
Note that the choice of a discrete or a continuous model is not innocuous.
Firstly, because discrete and continuous models have qualitatively di®erent equi-
libria. The intuition is as follows. If bidders submit a continuous downward
sloping demand, a collusive equilibrium with a low stop-out price can be sus-
tained: at such an equilibrium, in order to capture a unit increase in quantity,
a bidder inevitably bids up the price, so that his total pro¯t will fall. How-
ever, if bidders can only submit a ¯nite number of bids, this is no longer true:
a bidder can capture a "large" increase in quantity with a negligible increase
in price, with positive probability, and therefore competition increases.1 Sec-
ondly, since the choice of a discrete or a continuous model a®ects the existence
of equilibria. For example, Haller and Lengwiler (1998) prove the existence
of equilibrium in a multi-unit discriminatory auction in a discrete model and
conclude that non-existence is an artifact of the Menezes and Monteiro (1995)
model, which considers prices and quantities as continuous variables. McAdams
(2001) con¯rms this idea: he proves the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in
the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that
are neither private nor common, and points out that discreteness is essential to
his results: without discreteness, an equilibrium may not exist.
Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, bidders spread
their bids more in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction. There are
two contributing factors. On the one hand, bidders bid more aggressively on the
¯rst units in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction, since they have a
lower expected cost of doing so: if they win with the highest bids, they only pay
the weighted average price of winning bids instead of their bids, as they do in the
discriminatory auction. On the other hand, in the Spanish auction bidders have
incentives to lower their bids on later units, since they might determine the price
they pay for earlier units. Secondly, it is not possible to o®er a complete ranking
of the Spanish and the discriminatory auctions in terms of expected seller's
revenue, both because the ranking varies with the value of the parameters, and
because for some parameter values there are multiple equilibria, and the ranking
1See Nyborg (2001).
3
depends upon which of the equilibria is examined. Nevertheless, the Spanish
auction provides higher expected revenue than the discriminatory auction in a
number of cases.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of related
literature; Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 presents some features of
the algorithm used to solve the model and a discussion of the parameters used;
Section 5 presents the results; and ¯nally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Survey of the literature
An abundant literature exits for the auctioning of a single, indivisible item, in
uniform and discriminatory auctions, and general results are established, re-
sults that can be extended to settings with multiple units, if each bidder has
a taste for only one item.2 But as Ausubel and Cramton (2002) mention, "in
environments where bidders desire multiple items, general results (...) are not
well understood". The reason is that the problem is very complex. Firstly, be-
cause bidders have a very large strategy space. And secondly, because there is a
strategic component in bidding: for example, in a uniform auction, bids on later
units might determine the price the bidder pays for earlier units. In addition, if
there is private information, as is usually assumed in Treasury auctions, equi-
librium bids must address not only the strategic component of bidding, but also
the inference problem due to asymmetric information, and the problem becomes
even more complex.
According to Viswanathan et al. (2001), "while there has been progress in
uniform price auctions and in optimal auctions, very little is known about the
multi-unit discriminatory auction with variable awards". For discrete units and
private values, Engelbecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) solve the two unit discrim-
inating auction numerically; Tenorio (1999) solves a two bidders and two units
example; and Reny (1999) shows the existence of equilibrium with downward
sloping marginal valuations. For discrete units and common value, with private
information, Gordy (1996) uses numerical simulations to ¯nd equilibria for the
discriminatory auction, when two units of an indivisible good are auctioned to
I bidders. He ¯nds evidence that supports the conjecture that multiple bidding
can be used to hedge against uncertainty and the winner's curse, when bidders
are risk averse. For continuous units, Viswanathan et al. (2001) analyze the
two bidder discriminating auction with a±liated valuations; Wang and Zender
(2002) characterized the equilibria for both the discriminatory and the uniform
auction when bidders possess private information; and Ausubel and Cramton
(2002) provide several examples to demonstrate that auctions results are ine±-
cient, and that the ranking of uniform and discriminatory auctions in terms of
2See for example Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a characterization of auctions of one
indivisible unit, and Harris and Raviv (1981) and Weber (1982) for a characterization of
auctions on multiple units, where bidders only demand one unit.
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expected seller's revenue is ambiguous: they provide examples with reasonable
speci¯cations of demand where the uniform auction provides higher expected
seller's revenue than the discriminatory auction, and equally reasonable speci¯-
cations where the reverse is true.
If little is known about the multi-unit discriminatory auction, even less is
known about the Spanish auction. To our knowledge, the properties of the
Spanish auction have been studied only by Salinas (1990), Maz¶on and Nu~nez
(1999), ¶Alvarez et al. (2002) and Abbink et al. (2001). Salinas (1990) presents
a model where demand is restricted to one unit per bidder, and values are
private. He uses the results of Maskin and Riley (1989) to argue that the Spanish
mechanism generates the same expected revenue as uniform and discriminatory
auctions. Maz¶on and Nu~nez (1999), in a model that assumes that demand
functions are common knowledge and a bid is a price-quantity pair, show that
the Spanish auction is the equivalent in terms of revenue to the seller to the
discriminatory format, and that both formats maximize the seller's revenue.
They also present an empirical analysis, using data of Spanish security auctions
between 1993 and 1997. They ¯nd evidence of the good functioning of the
market, and the relatively low price di®erentials paid by accepted bids, which
is consistent with the predictions of the model. ¶Alvarez et al. (2002) follow
the "share auctions" approach proposed by Wilson (1979), where the good is
assumed to be perfectly divisible and a bid is a smooth demand schedule, and
solve a common value model with no private information. They use the model
in Wang and Zender (2002) to characterize the set of linear equilibria for the
Spanish auction. For that setting, they ¯nd parameter values in which the
Spanish format yields higher expected seller's revenue than the other two auction
formats. Finally, Abbink et al.(2001) report an experiment that compares the
discriminatory and the Spanish auction, in a common value model with private
information. Results show signi¯cantly higher seller's revenue with the Spanish
format, and the use of bid spreading in both auction formats.
3 The model
To analyze the Spanish auction, we adapt Gordy's (1996) model, which studies
the discriminatory auction, to the Spanish format. Two indivisible and identical
units are for sale, and I ¸ 2 bidders compete for them. Each bidder submits
two sealed bids, specifying a price, but not a particular unit.3 The two units
are awarded to the two highest bids, and if there is a tie, there is randomization
among the tied bids.
3Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) report that of the 34 countries in their study, only two
(Latvia and Jordan) restrict bidders to a single bid each. The great majority place no limit on
the number of bids per bidder. Besides, bidders do make use of multiple bids: Gordy (1996)
reports that bidders in the United States and Portugal make an average of three bids per
bidder, and Maz¶on and Nu~nez (1999) report that bidders in Spain make an average of 2.6
bids per bidder.
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The true value of each unit of the good for sale, v, is unknown to the bidders
at the time of bidding. Let F (v) be the prior distribution of v. We assume
that F (v) is public information and is Beta (®¹; ® (1 ¡ ¹)); this distribution
has a mean ¹ and variance decreasing in ®.4 Bidders have private information:
each bidder observes a signal from the ¯nite set X := f0; 1; :::; Kg, with K > 0.
Signals are independent across bidders and each bidder only observes his own
signal. The probability distribution of the signal conditional on v is assumed to
be Binomial (K;v).
Bidders combine public information, the prior on v, and private information,
the signal received, using Bayes' rule. The beta distribution is conjugate for a
signal drawn from a binomial distribution5, so that the posterior distribution
of v, F (v=x), is Beta (x + ®¹; K ¡ x + ® (1 ¡ ¹)), where x is the signal that
the bidder has received (x 2 X). The posterior expectation of v is E (v=x) =
±(x=K) + (1 ¡ ±)¹, where ± = (1 + ®=K)¡1. Thus, E (v=x) is a strictly convex
combination of the estimation of v based on public and private information, ¹
and x=K respectively, where the weight given to each one depends on its relative
accuracy. Note that the posterior variance of v is decreasing in K and ®.
We allow for a ¯nite number of prices: prices are restricted to a ¯nite set
¤ := f0; 1=¸; 2=¸; :::; 1g, where ¸ is some positive integer. As argued in the
Introduction, the choice of a discrete model is not innocuous and in practice,
Treasury auctions in Spain (and in most countries) have restrictions on the set
of bids permitted.6
We assume that bidders are risk averse7, and that they have a constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, U (z) = ¡ exp(½z), where ½ > 0
is the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion, common to all bidders, and z is the
pro¯t obtained by the bidder on the auction, which depends on the auction
format.
We consider two auction formats: the Spanish auction and the discrimina-
tory auction. Pro¯ts to bidders from the auction are calculated as the valuation
minus payments. For both auction formats, the valuation is equal to 2v if a
bidder gets two units, since he values both units equally; and is equal to v if
he only gets one unit. Payments depend on the auction format. In the Spanish
auction, winning bids pay the bid price for each unit if this is lower than the
weighted average price of winning bids (WAP ), and pay the WAP if the bid
4The beta distribution can take on a variety of unimodal and bimodal forms with support
in [0; 1], and is well suited for modeling the distribution of the true value of the good.
5See DeGroot (1970).
6Bids must be made for at least 1,000 euros, and bids for larger amounts must be made for a
multiple of 1,000 euros. Investors must indicate the desired nominal amount and theprice they
are willing to pay. The price must be expressed as a percentage of the nominal (or face) value.
For additional imformation on the Spanish auction rules see http://www.mineco.es/tesoro/
7See Gordy (1996), (1999) and Wang and Zender (2002) for a justi¯cation.
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price is equal to or higher than the W AP . In the discriminatory auction, win-
ning bids pay the bid price. For example, assume that there are two bidders,
A and B, bidding (4; 1) and (3; 2), respectively. Winning bids are 4 and 3, and
each bidder gets one unit in both auction formats. In the Spanish auction, A
pays (4 + 3)=2, the W AP , and B pays 3. In the discriminatory auction, A pays
4 and B pays 3.
The model is a simultaneous game of incomplete information and we consider
pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A strategy or a decision rule for bidder
i is a function si, which gives the player's pair of bids for each realization of
the signal he received, xi. Therefore, si : X ! ¤ £ ¤, speci¯es for each signal
xi 2 X a pair of bids si (xi) =
¡
s1i (xi) ; s
2
i (xi)
¢
2 ¤£¤, where s1i (xi) ¸ s2i (xi);
we refer to s1i (xi) and s
2
i (xi) as the high and the low bid for bidder i and
signal xi , respectively. Let s¡i (x¡i) 2 (¤ £ ¤)I¡1 be a pair of bids for all
players but i, where x¡i 2 XI¡1. Since bidder i's pro¯t, given the auction
format, only depends on (si (xi) ; s¡i (x¡i)), we write his utility function as
Ui (si (xi) ; s¡i (x¡i)). A pro¯le of decision rules (s1; :::; sI) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if and only if, for all i and xi 2 X ,
E fUi (si (xi) ; s¡i (x¡i)) = xig ¸ E fUi (bsi; s¡i (x¡i)) = xig
for all bsi 2 ¤£ ¤, where the expectation is taken over v, the value of the good,
and x¡i , the vector of his rivals' signals, and is conditional on xi. That is,
the bid pair for any signal maximizes the bidder's conditional (on the signal)
expected utility, given the strategies of all other bidders. In addition, a pro¯le
of decision rules is symmetric if all bidders play the same decision rule. We
only consider symmetric equilibria.8 In such equilibria, if two bidders submit a
di®erent pair of bids, it is because they have received di®erent signals.
4 Solving the model
We solve the model numerically, given the di±culties in solving the model an-
alytically, even for the simplest case (two bidders, two signals and two possible
prices). We ¯nd equilibria for di®erent vectors of parameter values. The code
has been written in TurboPascal 5.5.9 In this section, we present some basic
features of the algorithm we use and discuss the parameters used to calculate
the equilibria.
For a given vector of parameter values, denote by ¡ the set of all possible
functions s : X ! ¤£¤. As both X and ¤ are ¯nite, so is ¡. In order to shorten
computation time, we consider only strategies in which s1 (xi) is non-decreasing
8In what follows, we will drop the subindex refering to the bidder in any equilibrium
strategy.
9The code will be provided by the authors upon request.
7
in xi.
10 Denote by b¡ the subset of ¡ containing such strategies. For every s 2 b¡,
we check whether (s; :::;s) is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium: we list
all the elements in b¡ in some arbitrary order, and run through the list checking
every element.
How do we check whether s 2 b¡ is an equilibrium? We extend Gordy's
(1996) analysis to the Spanish auction (he considers the discriminatory auction).
For a given s 2 b¡, we assume that all bidders but i are playing s, that is,
s¡i = (s; :::;s), and check whether bidder's i best response to s¡i is s. If the
answer is yes, the pro¯le of decision rules (s; :::s) is an equilibrium. We check
all strategies in b¡exhaustively.
To calculate the expected utility for bidder i of bidding an arbitrary strategybs, given that all other players are bidding s¡i = (s; :::;s), conditional on signal
xi, we proceed in the following way. Let - be the set of events that might
occur to a bidder under the Spanish format, and let ¾ be an element in -. The
elements in - are: (a) to get two units, and pay the WAP for the ¯rst unit and
the low bid for the second unit; (b) to get one unit and pay the high bid, (c) to
get one unit and pay the WAP ; and (d) to get zero units. We can write:
E fUi (bs; s¡i (x¡i)) = xig = X
¾2-
E fUi (bs; s¡i (x¡i)) = xi ; ¾gPr (¾ = bs; s¡i; xi)
where Pr (¾ = bs; s¡i; xi) is the probability of event ¾ conditional on (bs; s¡i; xi) :
Proposition 1 presents some simpli¯cations to compute each of the terms in
the previous summation. To simplify notation, let:
Vi (bs; s¡i ;xi; ¾) := E fUi (bs; s¡i (x¡i)) = xi; ¾g Pr (¾ = bs; s¡i ; xi)
and - := fa; b; c; dg, where the elements in - are as listed above.
Proposition 1. For the Spanish format, the following holds:
(i) Vi (bs; s¡i ; xi ; a) = ¡ Px¡i pa (bs; s¡i ; x¡i; xi) za (x¡i; xi)
(ii) Vi (bs; s¡i; xi; b) = ¡ exp ¡½ ¡1 ¡ bs1¢¢ Px¡i pb (bs; s¡i; x¡i; xi) zb (x¡i ;xi)
(iii) Vi (bs; s¡i; xi; c) = ¡ Ps exp¡½ ¡1 ¡ 12 ¡bs1 + s¢¢¢ Px¡i pc (bs; s¡i; x¡i; xi) zc (x¡i ; xi)
(iv) Vi (bs; s¡i; xi ; d) = ¡ exp ¡½ ¡2 ¡ 32bs1 ¡ 12bs2¢¢ Px¡i pd (bs; s¡i; x¡i; xi) zd (x¡i; xi)
where p¾ (bs; s¡i ; x¡i ;xi) denotes the probability that event ¾ takes place con-
ditional on (bs; s¡i ; x¡i; xi) and z¾ (x¡i ;xi) is de¯ned in the Appendix.
This proposition is straightforward from Gordy (1996), and thus we omit the
proof. The interest of the proposition is to decouple, for instance, Vi (bs; s¡i; xi ; b)
in (ii), into two terms. The ¯rst, ¡ exp
¡
½
¡
1 ¡ bs1¢¢, depends only on bs. The
10Gordy(1996) looks for equilibria within ¡ and in every equilibria he obtains for the dis-
criminatory auction, the high bid is non-decreasing in the signal, as we are assuming.
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second term is a summation across the possible vectors of rivals' signals, x¡i,
which is a summation of a ¯nite number of terms. Furthermore, each term in this
summation is a product: pb (bs; s¡i; x¡i; xi) zb (x¡i ; xi), where pb (bs; s¡i ; x¡i ;xi)
is easily computable and zb (x¡i; xi) does not depend on strategies, and thus
only has to be computed once for every vector of parameter values. Note that
Proposition 1 states implicitly that the expectation over v is embedded in the
latter product.
The algorithm that we use di®ers from Gordy's (1996). He starts with an
arbitrary s 2 ¡, assumed to be played by I ¡ 1 bidders, and computes the best
response to it (in ¡) by the remaining bidder, say f (s). If f (s) = s, then s is an
equilibrium and another element in ¡ is selected as a candidate at random. If
f (s) 6= s, then the best response to f (s) is computed, f (f (s)), and the process
is repeated until some strategy s0 is the best response to itself (f (s0) = s0). Note
that Gordy's exploration of ¡ might enter a loop if f (f (s)) = s but f (s) 6= s.
The vector of parameters of the model is (¹; ®; ½; I; ;¸ K ), and we follow
Gordy (1996) mostly in the selection of the values of the parameters we use.11
We have kept ¹, the a priori expected value of the value of the good for sale,
equal to 0:75 throughout all the vectors of parameter values considered. Note
that ¹ must lie in (0; 1), and that if ¹ were too small, the a posteriori expected
value of v would be too small for bidders to bid strictly positive bids for every
possible signal. For the parameter of accuracy of prior information, ®, we have
selected values in f2; 4; 6; :::; 20g. For ® = 2, i.e., the maximum uncertainty
case within the previous set, the standard deviation of the prior distribution of
v is 0:25. For ® = 20, the standard deviation is approximately 0:1. For the
risk aversion parameter, ½, we have selected values in f1; 5;10g. The remaining
parameters, I , the number of bidders, ¸, where ¸ +1 is the number of prices the
bidder can choose from, and K, where K+1 is the number of possible signals, af-
fect the computation time. To keep this computation time within an acceptable
limit, we take I in f2; 3; 4g and ( ;¸ K) in f(5; 2) ; (5; 4) ; (9; 2)g. In summary, for
each auction format we have to explore 270 parameter combinations (10 values
for ® £ 3 for ½ £ 3 for I £ 3 combinations of ¸ and K).
Figure 112 shows a strategy that is an equilibrium for (®;½; I; ¸; K) =
(4; 1; 2; 5; 4). The vector of possible signals is represented on the horizontal
axis, and the vector of possible prices on the vertical axis. Since K is equal to 4,
there are 5 possible signals, f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g, and since ¸ equals 5, permitted bids
are
©
0; 1
5
; 2
5
; 3
5
; 4
5
; 1
ª
. For each signal, we plot the high (circle) and low (square)
bid.
11Gordy (1996) searches for equilibria in more than 1,000 parameter combinations, and
presents results for a subset of them, mentioning that results for other parameter values are
broadly consistent. We are constrained by computation time, given that we exhaustively check
whether all strategies in b¡ are an equilibrium, and are therefore able to consider a smaller
number of parameter combinations than Gordy (1996).
12At the end of the paper.
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5 Results
In this section we present the results about the bid spread and seller's revenue
for both auction formats.
When considering the equilibria, an initial issue that arises is that of exis-
tence. There exists at least one equilibrium for 51% of the parameter combi-
nations considered for the Spanish auction, and for 96% for the discriminatory
auction. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique in 60% of the parameter combi-
nations for which there is equilibrium for the Spanish auction, and in 41% for the
discriminatory auction. Therefore, our paper adds evidence to the non-existence
and non-uniqueness of equilibria. In the rest of the paper, we concentrate on
parameter combinations for which there exists at least one equilibrium for both
the Spanish and the discriminatory formats. There are 136 such combinations
(out of the 270 initially considered).
5.1 Bid Spread
In this subsection we investigate how bidders use the fact that they can bid for
each unit at a di®erent price. Note that the bidders' value of the good is the
same for both units, but that in many equilibria they bid two di®erent prices
for each unit given the same signal.
First, we compare the use of multiple bidding in the Spanish and the dis-
criminatory auctions. For i = 1; 2, and strategy s =
¡
s1; s2
¢
, de¯ne the expected
high (low) bid as E(si) =
PK
x=0 s
i (x) Pr (x).13 In the example in Figure 1, the
expected high bid is 0:54, and the expected low bid is 0:46. A priori, a strategy
that is an equilibrium for the Spanish auction should have a higher expected
high bid and a lower expected low bid than a strategy that is an equilibrium for
the discriminatory auction. A higher expected high bid, because in the Spanish
auction, bidders can increase the high bid at a lower cost than in the discrim-
inatory auction, since if they overbid, they only pay the W AP . And a lower
expected low bid, since in the Spanish auction the low bid may determine the
price the bidder has to pay on both units, so that bidders have an incentive
to lower the low bid. Does it hold that the expected high bid is higher in the
Spanish than in the discriminatory auction? And that the expected lower bid
is lower in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction?
As expected, our results show that in 92% of the 136 parameter combinations
for which there are equilibria for both auction formats, the expected high bid
is higher (or equal) in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction, and
in 84% of the 136 parameter combinations, the expected low bid is lower (or
equal) in the Spanish than in the discriminatory case. Therefore, given the
13When there are multiple equilibria for a given parameter combination, we assume that all
equilibria occur with the same probability and calculate the expected high (low) bid across
equilibria.
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rules of the auctions, bidders use a higher bid spread in the Spanish than in the
discriminatory auction, because they bid higher for the ¯rst unit and lower for
the second unit than in the discriminatory auction.
Second, we test whether Gordy's (1999) conjectures for the discriminatory
auction about the use of bid spread also hold for the Spanish auction. Gordy
(1999) makes two conjectures about why bidders submit multiple bids in a pure
common-value auction. His ¯rst conjecture is that risk averse investors will have
a downward sloping demand for any risky security. And his second conjecture
is that multiple bids may o®er a way to hedge against the winner's curse. By
spreading bids over a range of prices, bidders hedge against the risk of winning
due to a misestimation of the value of the security (the winner's curse), since
when demand is weaker than they expected (when they have overestimated the
value of the good), they win at a lower average price than expected, and when
demand is stronger than expected, they win at a higher price than expected.
In other words, multiple bidding reduces the winner's curse by aligning the
bidder's outcome more closely to the aggregate outcome of the auction. If both
conjectures are true, bidders' use of multiple bids increases with the degree of
uncertainty in the market, since the greater the uncertainty, the riskier it is to
buy and the greater the potential for the winner's curse. And the winner's curse
conjecture implies that bidders' use of multiple bids increases with the number
of bidders. Gordy (1999) ¯nds evidence to support these conjectures in a sample
of Portuguese Treasury bill auctions, and provides theoretical motivation.
A priori, this strategic use of bid spread should also be present in the Spanish
auction. Therefore, as in Gordy (1996), we calculate, for any s that is an
equilibrium strategy, the bid spread, ¢ (s), de¯ned as the di®erence between
the expected high and low bid. Formally: ¢ (s) =
PK
x=0
¡
s1 (x) ¡ s2 (x)
¢
Pr (x).
Since s1 (x) and s2 (x) lie in [0; 1] with s1 (x) ¸ s2 (x), so does ¢ (s). In the
example in Figure 1, ¢ (s) = 0:08. Note that if Gordy's conjectures are correct,
bid spread should increase as uncertainty and the potential for winner's curse
increase, i.e., as the degree of risk aversion, ½, and the number of bidders, I ,
increase, and as the precision of public or private information decreases, i.e., as
® and K decrease.
Table 1 presents the average bid spread for di®erent parameter combinations,
for both the Spanish and the discriminatory formats. For example, the average
bid spread for parameter combinations with K equal 2 for the Spanish auction
is 0:148, and for the discriminatory auction 0:105.
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Table 1: Average bid spread
K ¸ ½ I
Parameter value 2 4 5 9 1 5 10 2 3 4
Spanish 0.148 0.104 0.114 0.190 0.039 0.116 0.201 0.074 0.173 0.221
Discriminatory 0.105 0.055 0.065 0.154 0.001 0.074 0.151 0.035 0.128 0.163
®
Parameter value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Spanish 0.289 0.225 0.213 0.163 0.201 0.133 0.103 0.086 0.054 0.049
Discriminatory 0.135 0.146 0.145 0.128 0.110 0.094 0.078 0.071 0.041 0.037
In Table 1, note ¯rst that for all the parameter combinations considered, as
expected, the bid spread is higher for the Spanish than for the discriminatory
auction: as we have argued above, the expected high bid is higher and the
expected lower bid is lower in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction.
For both auction formats, the bid spread is increasing in risk aversion, ½,
and in the number of bidders, I , and is decreasing in the accuracy of private
information, K . With respect to public information, as the accuracy of public
information, ®, decreases, the bid spread also decreases, both for the Spanish
and the discriminatory formats, except for the change from ® = 8 to ® = 10
for the Spanish, and from ® = 2 to ® = 4 for the discriminatory auction.
Therefore, our results suggest that Gordy's conjectures are also valid for the
Spanish auction: bidders spread their bids to hedge against uncertainty and the
winner's curse.
5.2 Seller's Revenue
If the seller's ob jective is to maximize revenue, should he use the Spanish or
the discriminatory format? In this subsection, we try to answer this question
by, ¯rstly, comparing the probability distributions of the seller's revenue in the
¯rst-order stochastic sense, secondly, comparing the expected seller's revenue
for both auction formats, and thirdly, using a stronger de¯nition of dominance.
A priori, what is the intuition about how both auction formats compare in
terms of the seller's revenue? There are two opposite e®ects. On the one hand,
as we have argued before, bidders in the Spanish auction bid more aggressively
for the ¯rst unit than in the discriminatory auction, given that if they have the
higher bid, they only pay the W AP ; therefore, the seller's revenue could be
higher for the Spanish than for the discriminatory auction. On the other hand,
the fact that bidders only pay the WAP instead of their bid if they have the
higher bid, and additionally, the fact that they have incentives to lower the low
bid, suggest that the seller's revenue could be lower for the Spanish than for the
discriminatory auction.
In order to compare the seller's revenue for both auction formats, we ¯rst
built the probability distribution of the seller's revenue for each auction format
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and each vector of parameters, and compared them using ¯rst-order stochastic
dominance.14 The idea is that every expected utility maximizer that values
more over less, given two probability distributions, prefers the one that ¯rst-
order dominates the other. We built the probability distribution of the seller's
revenue in the following way. Note that for both auction formats, given a vector
of parameter values, the seller's revenue is uniquely determined by a strategy,
s, and an I + 1 dimensional vector of signals, x. Denote by r (x; s) the seller's
revenue when bidders use strategy s and observe signals on x. Next, denote
by Pr (r (x; s)) the probability of r (x; s). Assuming that the vector of signals
and the equilibrium strategy chosen by the bidders are independent, and that
whenever there are multiple equilibria, strategies are equiprobable, we have that
Pr (r (x; s)) = Pr (x)Pr (s) = Pr (x) (1=N ), N being the number of equilibrium
strategies for the given vector of parameter values. Using these probabilities,
we calculate the distribution function of the seller's revenue.
When we consider ¯rst-order stochastic dominance, we can only compare
probability distributions for 76 of the 136 parameter combinations for which
equilibria exists for both auction formats. For the remaining 60 cases, the prob-
ability distributions are not comparable in the ¯rst-order stochastic sense. For
the 76 cases for which they are comparable, the probability distribution for the
Spanish auction dominates the probability distribution for the discriminatory
auction in the ¯rst-order stochastic sense for 23 parameter combinations, the
probability distribution for the discriminatory auction dominates the probabil-
ity distribution for the Spanish auction for 37 parameter combinations, and
probability distributions for both auction formats are identical for 16 parame-
ter combinations. Therefore, neither the Spanish nor the discriminatory auction
yields unambiguously higher seller's revenue: the comparison depends on the
parameter combinations considered.
Since ¯rst-order dominance allows us to compare only 56% of the parameter
combinations for which equilibria for both auctions exists, we next compare the
expected seller's revenue. Note that if the seller is risk neutral, he will rank
both auction formats considering expected revenue. De¯ne the seller's expected
revenue given strategy s, as R (s) =
P
x r (x; s)Pr (x), where x is the I + 1
dimensional vector of bidders' private signals, and r (x; s) is the seller's revenue
given such a vector and strategy s, as de¯ned above. Note that R (s) 2 [0; 2]. In
the example in Figure 1, R(s) = 1:08. Again, when there are multiple equilibria
for a given parameter combination, we consider that all equilibria occur with
the same probability and calculate average expected revenue accordingly.
For the 136 parameter combinations for which there are equilibria for both
auctions, the Spanish auction has higher average expected seller's revenue than
the discriminatory auction in 50% of the parameter combinations considered,
14The distribution of monetary payo®s G1(:) ¯rst-order stochastically dominates the distri-
bution G2(:) if and only if G1(x)  G2(x) for every x. That is, the probability of getting at
least x is higher under G1(:) than under G2(:). See MasColell et al (1995).
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the discriminatory auction has higher average expected seller's revenue than
the Spanish auction in 38:2%, and the average expected seller's revenue is equal
for both auction formats in the remaining 11:8%.15 How do these results com-
pare with our previous results on ¯rst-order stochastic dominance? Given a
probability distribution G1 (:) that ¯rst-order dominates distribution G2 (:), the
mean under G1 (:) is higher than the mean under G2 (:); although a ranking
of means does not imply that one distribution stochastically dominates the
other.16 Therefore, our results suggest that in most parameter combinations for
which probability distributions are not comparable in the ¯rst-order stochas-
tic sense, the Spanish auction has higher expected seller's revenue than in the
discriminatory auction. Once more, the comparison depends on the parameter
combination considered. Note that when comparing the expected seller's rev-
enue, the Spanish auction ranks better than the discriminatory auction in half
of the cases.
How does the expected seller's revenue vary with the parameters? Table
2 presents the average expected seller's revenue for di®erent parameter combi-
nations for each auction format. For example, the expected seller's revenue in
equilibria for all parameter combinations with K = 2, is 1:159 for the Spanish
auction and 1:119 for the discriminatory auction.
Table 2: Average expected seller's revenue
K ¸ ½ I
Par. Value 2 4 5 9 1 5 10 2 3 4
Spanish 1.159 1.136 1.128 1.213 1.229 1.175 1.100 1.071 1.207 1.253
Discriminatory 1.119 1.121 1.090 1.187 1.158 1.157 1.069 1.034 1.177 1.218
®
Par. Value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Spanish 0.956 1.005 1.090 1.120 1.168 1.180 1.199 1.211 1.217 1.230
Discriminatory 0.854 0.974 1.029 1.101 1.124 1.144 1.167 1.183 1.206 1.207
From Table 2, note that for both auction formats, the average expected
seller's revenue is increasing in the number of possible prices, ¸, the number
of players, I , and the accuracy of public information, ®; and is decreasing in
the parameter of risk aversion, ½. The results on ½, I and ® are in accordnce
with the results for Milgrom and Weber's (1982) single-unit model: bidders bid
more aggressively as risk aversion decreases, and as the number of players or
the accuracy of public information increases, and consequently the expected
seller's revenue increases. Note also that for each of the parameters considered,
the expected seller's revenue is, on average, higher for the Spanish than for the
discriminatory auction.
15The average expected seller's revenue is equal for both auction formats whenever the
probability distribution of the seller's revenue is equal for both auction formats. Note that
this occurs when the high bid is identical for all signals and for both auction formats, and
therefore the two units will be awarded to the high bids with probability 1.
16See Mas-Colell et al (1995).
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Next, we drop the assumption that all equilibria occur with the same prob-
ability for a given parameter combination, and de¯ne dominance as a stronger
criteria to compare the expected seller's revenue for each parameter combina-
tion. For a given combination of parameters, we say that the Spanish auction
dominates the discriminatory auction in terms of expected seller's revenue, if all
equilibria in the Spanish auction have no lower expected seller's revenue than
all equilibria in the discriminatory auction, and at least one equilibrium in the
Spanish auction has higher expected seller's revenue than any in the discrim-
inatory auction. According to this de¯nition, the Spanish auction dominates
the discriminatory auction in terms of expected seller's revenue in 39% of the
parameter combinations (which, of course, does not imply that the former is
dominated by the discriminatory auction in the remaining cases).
Table 3 presents results in dominance. For example, in 42% of parameter
combinations with K = 2, the Spanish auction dominates the discriminatory
auction. It is noteworthy that the Spanish auction dominates the discriminatory
auction in 82% of the cases when risk aversion is low (for ½ = 1), and as the
parameter of risk aversion increases, the percentage falls. The intuition is simple.
As we explained above, bidders bid more aggressively for the ¯rst unit in the
Spanish auction than in the discriminatory auction, and this e®ect is especially
strong if bidders have low risk aversion. This more aggressive bidding gives the
seller higher expected revenue in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction.
The change in dominance when the other parameters change is not clear.
Table 3: Dominance of the Spanish auction
K ¸ ½ I
Par. Value 2 4 5 9 1 5 10 2 3 4
42% 29% 41% 34% 82% 33% 24% 31% 47% 44%
®
Par. Value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
63% 25% 40% 27% 33% 23% 41% 29% 44% 69%
Summarizing, we have compared the seller's revenue for both the Spanish
and the discriminatory auction in three di®erent ways and arrive at the same
conclusion: the comparison depends on the parameters considered. These re-
sults coincide with results reported in other papers. For example, Ausubel and
Cramton (2002), who follow the "share auction" approach, provide examples
that show that the ranking of the uniform and the discriminatory auction in
terms of the expected seller's revenue depends on the parameters of the model.
They provide examples with reasonable speci¯cations of demand where the uni-
form auction dominates the discriminatory auction in terms of expected seller's
revenue, and equally reasonable speci¯cations where the opposite is true. With
respect to the comparison of the discriminatory and the Spanish auction, ¶Alvarez
et al. (2002), also using a "share auction" approach, report that if the coe±cient
of variation of supply to competitive bidders is small, the expected seller's rev-
enue is higher for the Spanish than for the discriminatory auction; however, if
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the coe±cient of variation is large, the ordering of the expected seller's revenue
reverses.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper develops a model of multiple bids in a common value auction for the
Spanish auction format, following Gordy (1996), that develops the model for
the discriminatory auction. The Spanish auction is a hybrid system of discrimi-
natory and uniform price auctions: winning bidders pay their bid price for each
unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids, and pay
the weighted average price of winning bids otherwise. We use a discrete model,
in which there are two units for sale, and bidders bid for both units. The value
of the units is unknown at the time of the auction, and bidders have private
information. We numerically ¯nd all (if any) the Bayesian Nash symmetric
equilibria for a wide range of parameter values.
Our main results are the following. First, bid spread is higher in the Spanish
than in the discriminatory auction for two reasons. On the one hand, since the
cost of overbidding is lower due to the fact that a winning bidder with the
highest bid only pays the weighted average price, while he pays his bid in a
discriminatory auction, bidders bid more aggressively on the ¯rst unit. On
the other hand, since the bid on the second unit could change the price paid
on the ¯rst unit, bidders have an incentive to lower the low bid that is not
present in the discriminatory auction. Second, as Gordy (1999) suggested for
discriminatory auctions, bidders spread their bids in the Spanish auction to
hedge against uncertainty and the winner's curse. And third, it is not possible
to o®er a complete ranking of the Spanish and the discriminatory auctions in
terms of expected seller's revenue, since the ranking varies with the value of the
parameters.
The design of Treasury auctions is important, since countries are using them
to ¯nance public debts. We think that our results suggest that Treasuries around
the world should pay attention to the Spanish auction format. Opponents of the
discriminatory auction, the most widely used auction format, argue that bidders
shade their bids downward more in the discriminatory than in the uniform
format, aware of the cost of overbidding, and that as a result, seller's revenue
is lower. For example, the U.S. Treasury, when arguing in favor of the use of
uniform auctions, the format that it is now using, says that "auction participants
may bid more aggressively in single-price auctions. Successful bidders are able
to avoid the so-called "winner's curse". (...) We estimate that more aggressive
bidding has lowered Treasury borrowing cost somewhat".17 However, the U.S.
Treasury experiment yielded inconclusive results: "In a direct comparison of the
impact on revenue between the two techniques, the data show a small increase
in revenues to the Treasury under the uniform-price technique, but the di®erent
17http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/com/comintro.htm
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is not statistically signi¯ cant".18 The Spanish auction mitigates the downward
bias on bidding with respect to the discriminatory format, and could increase
participation. Our results show that the expected seller's revenue is higher than
with discriminatory auctions in a number of cases. If Treasuries are changing
from discriminatory to uniform auctions, why not try a hybrid of both that
presents good properties?
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Appendix: Notes on Proposition 1.
In this appendix we de¯ne some of the notation used in Proposition 1 and
present an additional statistical result which helps computation.
Recall that in Proposition 1, x¡i is the vector of signals of all bidders but i.
Let gx¡i (x¡i=xi) be the density conditional on the signal xi . We de¯ne:
za (x¡i ; xi) = gx¡i (x¡i = xi);
zb (x¡i ;xi) =1 F1
¡
IK ¡ ¡1T x¡i + xi¢ + ® (1 ¡ ¹) ; IK + ®; ½¢ gx¡i (x¡i = xi);
zc (x¡i ; xi) = zb (x¡i ; xi);
zd (x¡i; xi) =1 F1
¡
IK ¡ ¡1Tx¡i + xi¢ + ® (1 ¡ ¹) ; IK + ®; 2½¢ gx¡i (x¡i = xi),
where 1Tx¡i is the summation of the components of x¡i and 1F1 (:) is the
con°uent hypergeometric function (see Abramowitz and Stegun (1972)).
Additionally, it can be proven that:
gx¡i (x¡i = xi) = M (x¡i)¦
I¡1
i=1
¡
K
x¡i(j)
¢ B(xi+®¹;K¡xi+®(1¡¹))
B (®¹;®(1¡¹))
where M (:) and B (:) are the multinomial and beta functions, respectively
(see DeGroot (1970)), and x¡i (j) is the j-th entry of x¡i.
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Figure 1. An example of equilibrium
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